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Abstract: 
Is normative uncertainty like factual uncertainty? Should it have the 
same effects on our actions? Some have thought not. Those who 
defend an asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty 
typically do so as part of the claim that our moral beliefs in general 
are irrelevant to both the moral value and the moral worth of our 
actions (Weatherson 2014; Harman 2015). Here I use the consideration 
of Jackson cases to challenge this view, arguing that we can explain 
away the apparent asymmetries between normative and factual 
uncertainty by considering the particular features of the cases in 
greater detail. Such consideration shows that, in fact, normative and 
factual uncertainty are equally relevant to moral assessment.  
 




Can normative uncertainty affect what morality requires of us? If it is anything like 
factual uncertainty, it can. However, some have thought that there are significant 
differences between the two. Those who defend these differences typically do so as 
part of the claim that our moral beliefs are in general irrelevant to both the moral value 
and the moral worth of our actions (Weatherson 2014; Harman 2015). Jackson cases 
offer us a way to evaluate the truth of this claim about the asymmetry between 
normative and factual uncertainty. Jackson cases are situations in which the agent is 
uncertain about the moral values of the possible outcomes in the following way:   




 Beliefs Facts 
A Either +100 or -100 + 100 
B 0 0 
C Either +100 or -100 -100 
 
There is widespread agreement that someone appropriately concerned for moral 
value would choose option B1. This is because even though more moral value could 
be achieved by choosing A, to do this given what the agent currently believes about 
A would be reckless, and people appropriately concerned with moral value do not 
gamble with it in this way. There is debate to be had over whether this implies that 
option B is really the morally right thing to do, as Zimmerman (1997, 2008, 2014) 
argues, or whether really option A is the morally right thing to do, but there is some 
other consideration that explains why it would not be morally conscientious to choose 
it in this case.  For example, according to Bykvist (2014), option A is the morally right 
thing to do, but because the morally conscientious person has a preference for acting 
so as to promote moral value and avoid moral disvalue it would be rational for her to 
choose option B, because this maximises expected moral value. Similarly, Graham 
(2010) claims that the morally conscientious person prudentially ought to choose 
option B, even though morally she ought to choose option A; and that furthermore it 
                                                          
1 See for example, (Zimmerman 1997; Zimmerman 2008; J. 2014; Bykvist 2014; Graham 2010; 
Sepielli 2009; Moller 2011).  
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would be blameworthy to choose option A, even though this is the morally right 
option. Despite their differences, what all these views can agree on is that given the 
agent’s beliefs, it would be reckless for her to choose anything other than option B, 
and this recklessness deserves a negative moral assessment. 
It might be thought that if choosing option B is reprehensibly reckless, then this is true 
regardless of what it is that the agent is uncertain about. Harman (2015) and 
Weatherson (2014) disagree. They argue that choosing either option A or C does not 
deserve negative moral assessment if the uncertainty involved is normative - that is, 
if it is uncertainty about the moral deontic status of the possible outcomes – whether 
they are morally permissible, forbidden, or required. They argue that this is because 
our beliefs about the moral deontic status of possible outcomes are irrelevant to moral 
evaluation – unlike other beliefs, they do not affect what we morally ought to do, 
whether or not we are blameworthy, or the moral worth of our actions. This paper 
challenges this supposed exceptionality of normative uncertainty, arguing that once 
we factor in the way that what one ought to do depends on the exact degree to which 
we are uncertain, the stakes involved in the case, and the quality of the agent’s 
evidence, we can explain away any apparent distinctiveness of normative uncertainty. 
This provides some motivation to think that our beliefs about what is morally 
permissible, forbidden, or required are relevant to moral evaluation in just the same 
way that other beliefs are.  
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2. Jackson Cases 
The original Jackson case involves factual uncertainty: 
Drugs. A doctor has a patient with a minor but not trivial skin complaint. 
The doctor has three drugs to choose from, and careful consideration of 
the medical evidence available to her has led her to the following 
opinions. One of drugs A or C will completely cure the skin condition, 
the other will kill the patient. Crucially, she has no way of telling which 
of A and C will cure the patient, and which will kill him. However, she 
knows that drug B is very likely to relieve the condition but will not 
completely cure it (see Jackson, 1991: 462). 
It seems clear that the doctor should prescribe drug B, and this is despite the fact that 
she knows it is not the best option. For her to prescribe either of the other two drugs 
would be reckless. Prescribing either of drugs A or C would be reckless because her 
available information does not allow her to discriminate between them; for all she 
knows she could be prescribing poison, and curing a minor skin condition is not worth 
the risk of death. We can represent the case as follows: 
 
Drugs Beliefs Facts 
A Death or Cure Cure 
B Partial Cure Partial Cure 
C Death or Cure Death 
 
Jackson cases meet the following criteria: 
 The agent morally ought to choose an option that is sub-optimal. 
 The agent knows that the option she ought to choose is sub-optimal. 
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 It would be unacceptably reckless for the agent to choose any other 
option.  
In Drugs, the doctor is uncertain about some of the non-moral facts of the situation. 
Analogous cases involving evaluative uncertainty and normative uncertainty are also 
possible. An agent who is evaluatively uncertain is uncertain about the what the moral 
values of her options are2, she is uncertain whether performing the action would be 
morally good or morally bad. An agent who is normatively uncertain is uncertain 
about the deontic status of her options3, she is uncertain whether performing the 
action would be morally permissible, impermissible, or required. It is possible to be 
evaluatively uncertain without being normatively uncertain – one might be uncertain 
about the moral value of an outcome while being completely sure that it would be 
morally impermissible to perform the action, because doing so would be to recklessly 
risk doing something very bad. In other cases, agents will be both evaluatively and 
normatively uncertain, since if one is uncertain about the moral values of a case, then 
this can produce uncertainty about whether or not the action is morally permissible to 
perform. The focus of this discussion is on normative uncertainty.  In the cases under 
consideration, the agents are normatively uncertain because they are uncertain about 
which is the correct moral theory, and the competing moral theories disagree about 
the moral values of each option.  
                                                          
2 See Zimmerman (2008, 2014) for some discussion.  
3 See Graham (2010) for some discussion.  
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Like factual Jackson cases, normative Jackson cases should involve a choice between 
three options that are comparable to those of the original case: one should be a solution 
that will resolve the situation perfectly, producing the best outcome; another should 
be a catastrophe, and the third should be a partial resolution that does not resolve the 
situation completely. As in the original case, the agent should have no way of 
distinguishing between the perfect solution and the moral catastrophe. Here is an 
example: 
Voting. Bill is trying to decide which political party to vote for. He could 
vote for the Equality party, the Freedom party, or the Other party. 
Everyone he knows strongly supports the Equality party, but he is not 
entirely convinced by their emphasis on equality. He is also not entirely 
convinced by the policies of the Freedom party, but he finds some of 
them very persuasive. He has studied some political philosophy and 
finds himself pulled in two opposing directions. On the one hand he 
suspects the ideals of libertarian freedom upheld by the Freedom party 
are valuable, and knows that these are incompatible with the ideals of 
equality upheld by the Equality party. On the other hand, he is 
persuaded by the idea that equality can sometimes promote more 
happiness for the underprivileged, and wonders if libertarianism’s 
emphasis on freedom is misguided. He is entirely unmoved by the 
policies of the Other party, who do little to promote either freedom or 
equality, but he knows that were they to be elected they would at least 
do no great harm and are likely to make some small improvements in 
the efficiency of public services.  He must vote tomorrow, and has no 
more time to deliberate.  
 
Assume that Bill lives in a political system where his vote will have a direct effect on 
which party will be elected, such that which way he votes is a genuinely moral 
question. Each of the extremist parties would implement policies that promote one 
and only one of the political ideals – libertarian freedom or equality in distribution. 
The Other party would promote other, comparatively negligible, goods such as the 
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efficient running of public services. The political situation that would result from the 
election of either of the Freedom party or the Equality party would be either optimal 
or a disaster, depending on which moral theory turns out to be true, while the election 
of the Other party would have a neutral outcome. We can represent the case as 
follows: 
Voting Beliefs Facts4 
Equality Party Either very morally good or very 
morally bad.  
Very morally good. 
Other Party Neither morally good nor morally 
bad. 
Neither morally good nor morally 
bad. 
Freedom Party Either very morally good or very 
morally bad. 
Very morally bad. 
 
Whether voting for the Equality Party would have a positive or negative value moral 
depends on the moral facts of the case – on whether it is equality or freedom that is 
more morally valuable in this case. These moral facts affect what Bill ought to do when 
he goes to the voting booth, and it is these moral facts that he is uncertain about.   
It is compatible with this being a genuine Jackson case that both freedom and equality 
are indeed political goods, and promoting them would be morally good in some 
situations; but in this situation the outcome of promoting one would be a catastrophe, 
                                                          
4 The reader is free to switch the values of the actual outcome to suit her own political 
inclinations.  
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while the outcome of promoting the other would be best. Alternatively, it may also be 
the case that only one of freedom or equality is a genuine good, or that both are goods 
but one is significantly more important than the other. The important point is that Bill 
cannot tell from his current information whether it is freedom or equality that is 
required in this situation, but he knows that one would be the morally best option, 
one would be the morally worst option, and there is a third morally safe but sub-
optimal option available to him. If this is really a Jackson case then Bill’s uncertainty 
is relevant to what he ought to do, and he ought to choose the least risky option given 
his current evidence, and vote for the Other party5. Here is another case: 
Amputation. Tanishka is a doctor. She has a patient who is presenting 
symptoms of Body Integrity Identity Disorder. Patients with this 
disorder typically claim that a healthy and normally functioning limb is 
not theirs, that it feels ‘strange’, and that they want it to be removed. 
Post-amputation, patients typically report feelings of relief. 
Furthermore, Tanishka knows that patients with BIID who do not 
receive amputation often attempt to amputate limbs themselves, usually 
botching the job and risking their lives. Tanishka’s patient has asked 
Tanishka to remove his otherwise healthy left leg. Like most doctors 
who have taken courses in medical ethics, Tanishka believes both that 
doctors ought to respect the autonomy of their patients, and that doctors 
ought to avoid causing their patients harm. She believes that in order to 
respect her patient’s autonomy she should amputate the leg, but she also 
believes that the amputation would constitute causing her patient harm. 
She believes that if autonomy is of more moral importance then morally 
she ought to amputate, but if avoiding harm is of more moral 
importance then morally she ought not amputate, and she ought to take 
steps to ensure that the patient is prevented from performing his own 
amputation and botching it. She has a third option available; she could 
refer her patient for psychiatric therapy. She knows that such therapy 
                                                          
5 See (Guerrero 2007; Lockhart 2000; Sepielli 2009; Moller 2011) for other defences of 
mitigating risk in situations of normative uncertainty. 
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would be unlikely to completely cure the disorder, but it is likely to 
relieve some of the symptoms of the condition. 
  
Tanishka’s uncertainty is uncertainty about the relative importance, in this situation, 
of respecting autonomy and avoiding causing the patient harm. She knows that both 
are important, and she knows that they conflict in this situation. What she does not 
know is which she ought to be prioritise. If she amputates, she either does a good thing 
by respecting the patient’s autonomy, or she does a very bad thing in causing him 
harm. If she does not amputate, and keeps the patient under surveillance then she 
either does the right thing in preventing harm, or she does a very bad thing in 
unjustifiably constraining the patient’s autonomy in two ways – by not respecting his 
wishes to have his leg amputated, and then by infringing his privacy and liberty by 
keeping him under surveillance. When Tanishka deliberates she is trying to decide on 
the relative moral importance, in this situation, of autonomy and harm avoidance. 
Like the agents in the Voting and Drugs, she knows that she has a safe option 
available. Referring the patient for psychiatric therapy carries no risk of either of the 
worst options, but also does little to help the patient’s condition. We can represent the 
case as follows: 
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Amputation Beliefs Facts6 
Amputate Either very morally bad 
or very morally good.  
Very morally good. 
Psychiatric therapy Neither morally good 
nor morally bad.  
Neither morally good nor 
morally bad.  
No amputation, keep patient 
under surveillance. 
Either very morally bad 
or very morally good. 
Very morally bad. 
 
Those who deny the possibility of Jackson cases deny that the agents in Voting and 
Amputation ought to take the low risk option. Harman (2015) and Weatherson (2014) 
take the view that our moral beliefs are irrelevant to moral conscientiousness in a way 
that factual uncertainty is not, and that therefore there are significant asymmetries 
between how normative and factual uncertainty affects whether or not it would be 
appropriate for someone concerned with morality to take the safe option. They take 
the view that it is not morally conscientious to risk great wrongs by acting under 
factual uncertainty, but it is also not morally conscientious to respond to normative 
uncertainty by choosing the low risk option7. This position is suggested by some 
                                                          
6 The reader is free to switch the values of the actual outcome to suit her own moral views if 
she wishes.  
7 It is worth noting that Harman and Weatherson also share Zimmerman’s reading of the 
original factual Jackson case, and take the view that the doctor morally ought to prescribe 
drug B, because it is wrong to risk the patient’s life for the sake of a minor skin condition. I 
use the term ‘morally conscientious’ here so as to avoid taking a stand on what the agent 
morally ought to do. My quarrel is with the purported asymmetry between factual and 
normative uncertainty, rather than with any particular claim about what the agent morally 
ought to do.  
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apparent asymmetries between cases of normative and factual uncertainty. The 
following sections argue that these asymmetries can be explained away. Specifically, 
once we factor in the way that what it is appropriate for the morally conscientious 
person to do depends on the exact degree to which she is uncertain, the stakes 
involved in the case, and what her evidence supports, we can see that moral 
recklessness is to be avoided just as factual recklessness is, and there should be no 
asymmetry in our responses to Jackson cases involving normative and factual 
uncertainty.  
3. The Case for Asymmetry 
There are three apparent asymmetries between moral and factual uncertainty that the 
case for asymmetry rests on. If they are genuine, then there is reason to think that 
Harman and Weatherson are right that it would not be reprehensively reckless to 
choose the low risk option in normative Jackson cases, as it would in factual Jackson 
cases.  In this section I present the three putative asymmetries, and in the following 
section I show how they can be seen to be merely apparent once we consider their 
specific features in more detail. 
The first putative asymmetry is that there are cases in which it can seem morally 
permissible for an agent to perform actions that she is normatively uncertain about, 
while it is not permissible for her to perform actions that she is factually uncertain 
about. For example: 
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Dinner8. Martha is deciding whether to have steak or tofu for dinner. She 
prefers steak, but knows there are ethical questions around meat-eating. 
She has studied the relevant biological and philosophical literature, and 
concluded that it is not wrong to eat steak. But she is not completely 
certain of this; as with any other philosophical conclusion, she has 
doubts. As a matter of fact, Martha is right in the sense that a fully 
informed person in her position would know that in this instance it is 
permissible for her to order steak for dinner, but Martha cannot be 
certain of this. 
 
We might represent the Martha’s options as follows: 
 
Dinner Eating meat is wrong  Eating meat is not wrong 
 Moral Value Hedonistic Value Moral Value Hedonistic Value 
Steak -10 +20 0 +20 
Tofu 0 +5 0 +5 
 
Weatherson’s claim is that it is not wrong for Martha to have steak for dinner, despite 
the fact that she is completely certain that she has an option that is morally permissible 
– tofu9. If Martha chooses steak, then she risks incurring moral disvalue to gain the 
small pleasure of eating steak. Weatherson claims that intuitively, it would not be 
wrong for Martha to choose steak and this shows that moral recklessness cannot be 
wrong. If this is correct, then this would be one respect in which normative uncertainty 
differs from factual uncertainty. It would show that it is morally permissible to make 
reckless choices when the uncertainty is normative, but not when it is factual – as in 
                                                          
8 This example is borrowed from Weatherson (2014: 2). 
9 See also Harman's (2016) view that eating meat is a suberogatory but not morally 
prohibited action, a ‘morally permissible moral mistake’. 
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the Drugs case. In §4.1 I argue that this is not the conclusion we should draw from 
consideration of this case, because there are alternative explanations for the intuition 
that Martha is permitted to choose steak.  
The second apparent asymmetry is that there seem to be cases in which agents who 
act against their moral beliefs are praiseworthy, but if moral recklessness was a vice, 
then these agents would be the prime examples of morally reckless agents and we 
would expect them to be blameworthy rather than praiseworthy. Arpaly gives the 
example of the inversely akratic agent, Huck Finn: 
Huck Finn. Huck Finn befriends Jim, a slave, and helps him escape from 
slavery. While Huck and Jim are together on a raft used in the escape, 
Huck is plagued by what he calls “conscience.” He believes, as everyone 
in his society “knows,” that helping a slave escape amounts to stealing, 
and stealing is wrong. He also believes that one should be helpful and 
loyal to one's friends, but loyalty to friends is outweighed by some 
things, such as property rights, and does Miss Watson, Jim's owner, not 
have property rights? Hoping against hope to find some excuse not to 
turn Jim in, Huck deliberates. Like many children (and adults), Huck is 
not very good at abstract deliberation, and it never occurs to him to 
doubt what his society considers common sense. Thus, he fails to find a 
loophole. “What has poor Miss Watson done to me,” he berates himself, 
“that I can see her [slave] go away and say nothing at all?” Having thus 
deliberated, Huck resolves to turn Jim in, because it is “the right thing.” 
But along comes a perfect opportunity for him to turn Jim in, and he 
finds himself psychologically unable to do it. He accuses himself of 
being a weak‐willed boy, who has not “the spunk of a rabbit” and cannot 
bring himself to do the right thing, and eventually shrugs and decides 
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We might represent Huck’s options as follows: 
 
 
Huck Finn Freeing Jim is right Freeing Jim is wrong 
Turn Jim in Very morally bad Very morally good 
Free Jim  Very morally good  Very morally bad 
 
 
Intuitively, Huck’s action is praiseworthy, and this is despite the fact that he does it in 
the belief that it is wrong. He pays attention to the right kinds of things, Jim’s 
humanity and welfare, and this means that he cannot bring himself to turn Jim into 
the authorities, even though he mistakenly believes that turning him in would be the 
right thing to do. This seems to suggest that moral recklessness is not really a vice – 
Huck seems even more morally reckless than someone who fails to choose the low 
risk option when they are uncertain – he actually believes what he does is wrong, and 
does it anyway. If moral recklessness was a vice, then it seems we should blame him 
rather than praise him, and we should think he ought not free Jim. This apparent 
asymmetry is dealt with in §4.2. 
The third apparent asymmetry is that the normative and factual versions of taking the 
low risk option do not seem to have equal moral value when considered as long term 
decision making policies. While it can seem like a good policy for agents to take the 
low risk option in all cases of factual uncertainty, the same is not obviously true for 
normative uncertainty. Agents who consistently choose the risk-minimising option 
can seem morally cowardly, and moral cowardice can seem just as much of a moral 
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vice as moral recklessness, if not more so10, and it seems that such cowardice would 
be ubiquitous given that most agents are almost never certain about their moral views. 
Taking the view that appropriate concern for morality requires choosing the option 
that mitigates risk whenever one is less than fully certain, and when this option is 
typically morally sub-optimal, means that they will be almost no cases in which agents 
with correct moral beliefs are permitted to do the right thing. Employed over time, 
this position advocates a state of moral inertia. If acting on less than certain moral 
beliefs were always wrong, then it can seem that we would be forced to view agents 
who campaign for moral change, against the dominant views of their communities, as 
morally reckless and so not morally conscientious. On the assumption that the 
opinions of supposed moral authorities count as evidence for and against moral 
views, agents such as Rosa Parks, a civil rights campaigner in 1950s America would 
count as examples of moral recklessness, and the more ordinary people who followed 
her perhaps even more so. In the fact of so much disagreement, it can seem unlikely 
that they could have been sure that the new views were correct. So, in so far as acting 
on uncertain beliefs is reckless, they were not acting in a way that exhibited 
appropriate concern for morality. Cautiousness seems much less admirable when it is 
moral cautiousness rather than factual cautiousness – we typically evaluate advocates 
for moral change such as Rosa Parks as having acted in a morally admirable way, we 
see them as admirable examples of moral bravery, rather than reprehensibly reckless. 
                                                          
10 See Weatherson (forthcoming) for an articulation of this thought.  
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If acting under normative uncertainty was reckless in the same way that factual 
uncertainty was, then there would be no moral heroes. Agents who act rightly but 
against the majority opinion of their communities would always be acting recklessly 
– either they would be less than certain that they were acting rightly, because 
community disagreement would reduce their credence in their own rightness; or, if 
they did have credences high enough to justify action, then they would be doing so 
while recklessly disregarding evidence from community disagreement. So, if moral 
recklessness is to be thought of in the same way as factual uncertainty, then it seems 
we ought to prefer that these agents had pursued more conservative courses of action, 
and this seems unpalatable. However, §4.3 explains why this is not a genuine 
asymmetry. 
4. Alternative Explanations 
Defenders of the asymmetry between normative and factual uncertainty argue that 
what explains these asymmetries is that our beliefs about what is morally right have 
no effect either on what we morally ought to do, or on whether we are to be praised 
or blamed; they are irrelevant. This means that whether or not we are uncertain about 
moral claims has no effect on what we should do, and so moral recklessness is not a 
vice in the same way that factual recklessness is. I argue that this is the wrong 
conclusion to draw from the three apparent asymmetries outlined in the previous 
section, and suggest that closer consideration of the agent’s epistemic situation and 
the stakes involved shows that these asymmetries are merely apparent. This insight 
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shows that moral and factual recklessness, are in fact symmetrical, and so we have no 
reason to think that moral recklessness is not a vice. 
4.1 Dinner 
Dinner was supposed to show that moral recklessness is not wrong, even on the 
assumption that factual recklessness is. This asymmetry was based on the intuition 
that it is permissible for Martha to eat steak even though in doing so she risks some 
moral disvalue. However, it is not clear that the case does show this, because there is 
more than one way to explain this intuition and the putative non-viciousness of moral 
recklessness is only one such way. This section outlines two alternative explanations 
of the case: one based the observation that morality does not necessarily require us to 
always maximise moral value at the expense of all other value, and another based on 
the difficulty in distinguishing when our intuitions are tracking blameworthiness and 
when they are tracking moral permissibility.  
First, we might agree that Martha is permitted to choose the steak, but follow Harman 
(2016) in viewing this as morally suberogatory but permissible. For example, we might 
think although it would not be the morally best thing for her to do, she is permitted 
to risk a small amount of moral disvalue for the pleasure she would gain from eating 
the steak. This would mean that Weatherson is right about the moral permissibility of 
Martha’s choosing steak, but wrong to take this to imply that moral recklessness is 
never wrong. Instead, the right explanation is that morality does not always require 
us to maximise moral value at the expense of all other kinds of value, and this is a case 
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in which morality permits us to prioritise pleasure over the risk of moral disvalue. 
There is no asymmetry with factual uncertainty here – various examples from daily 
life suggest that it is at least sometimes permissible to risk some moral disvalue for 
our own pleasure11. For example: 
Driving. Amber is deciding whether to visit the art gallery or stay at 
home. To get to the art gallery she must drive. She would prefer to visit 
the art gallery, but she cannot be certain that she will not kill someone 
on the way. She knows that there is a small possibility that she will harm 
someone while driving.   
 
Driving Someone is harmed  No one is harmed 








0 -50 0 -50 
 
 
The case is structurally similar to Dinner, except that it involves factual rather than 
moral uncertainty. By driving to the art gallery, Amber is performing an action that 
she cannot be completely certain will avoid harm, because driving accidents are 
always possible. Nevertheless, risks of this kind are usually thought of as morally 
permissible in the factual case, even if not the morally best thing one could do. This is 
true even though the harm risked is even greater than in the Dinner case. This does 
not suggest an asymmetry between factual and normative uncertainty, but rather that 
                                                          
11 See also Guerrero (2007) on this point.  
Claire Field  claire.a.field@gmail.com 
19 
 
there are simply some risks that it morally permissible to take, and this is true 
regardless of whether the uncertainty is factual or normative. If it is permissible to risk 
the possibility of causing a traffic accident for the small pleasure of going to an art 
gallery, then it should not be surprising that the even smaller risk of wrongdoing in 
Dinner is also morally permissible. However, if there really was nothing of any value 
to be gained from driving, or from eating the steak, then it is not so clear that we would 
have the intuition that these actions were permissible12. Again, this is a respect in 
which factual and normative uncertainty are symmetrical. 
Second, an alternative explanation of the intuition is that it is not tracking moral 
permissibility at all, but rather blamelessness. Weatherson interprets the intuition as 
one that indicates the moral permissibility of choosing steak, but it is not so clear that 
our intuitions are sufficiently fine-grained for us to reliably distinguish intuitions of 
moral permissibility from intuitions of other moral evaluations, such as blamelessness 
or excusibility13. An alternative explanation of the intuition is that, in fact, Martha is 
not permitted to choose the steak – she really ought to choose tofu – but we are 
unwilling to blame her of failing to do so. We might think that it is never permissible 
to prioritise one’s own pleasure over any risk moral of disvalue, moral value is just 
too important to risk in this way. This would mean that neither Martha is not 
permitted to choose the steak, and nor is Amber permitted to drive to the art gallery, 
                                                          
12 Guerrero (2007) also makes this point.  
13 Various epistemologists take this to be a common phenomenon in our thinking about 
justification in the epistemic case (see (Littlejohn, forthcoming; Sutton 2007; Williamson 
2017).  
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but we might nevertheless be unwilling to blame her, and this unwillingness would 
explain the intuition that Weatherson draws on.  
There are at least two features of the case that could explain our unwillingness to 
blame Martha, despite the fact that she does something that is strictly impermissible. 
One such feature is that we might think blame is a serious sanction that is appropriate 
only for relatively serious transgressions, in which more is at stake than just one steak 
at one dinner. Although Martha does make a reckless choice, it is only very slightly 
reckless. So slight, in fact, that describing the case as ‘reckless’ sounds a little odd; we 
typically reserve the term for more serious cases where greater risks are taken. Even 
on the assumption that eating meat is wrong, choosing steak once at one meal is not a 
great moral catastrophe, and certainly not a catastrophe comparable to death in the 
original Jackson case. As such, risking this minor wrong is perhaps not something 
deserving of blame, even if the agent ought not to have done so. It is plausible that our 
intuitions might change were we to increase the stakes:  
Veganism. Martha is trying to decide whether to become a vegan or not. 
She enjoys eating meat and dairy products, so would prefer not to. She 
has studied the relevant philosophical literature carefully and 
concluded that it would not be morally wrong for her to choose to 
continue consuming meat and dairy products. However, she is not 
completely certain of this; as with any other philosophical conclusion, 
she has doubts. She also knows that if it turns out that she is wrong, the 
impact that a lifetime of consuming meat and dairy products would 
have would constitute a serious moral wrong. As a matter of fact, 
Martha is right in the sense that a fully informed person in her position 
would know that it is permissible for her to not become a vegan, but 
Martha cannot be certain of this. 
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The consequences of a lifetime of meat eating are much greater than the consequences 
of one steak at one dinner, and this is a case in which it is much less clear that Martha 
blameless for choosing a lifetime of meat-eating, given her uncertainty.  
Another reason we might be hesitant to evaluate Martha as blameworthy is that there 
are features of her epistemic situation that make her choice only very slightly reckless, 
and much less reckless than cases of recklessness that clearly would deserve blame, 
such as choosing anything but the partial cure in Drugs. Firstly, Martha is much more 
confident than a typical reckless agent. In Drugs, the doctor had ‘no way of telling’ 
which of drugs A and B was which, and this low confidence contributes to the sense 
that it would be very reckless for her to choose either of drugs A or B. However, 
Martha in Dinner is comparatively confident that it is permissible to eat steak – she is 
‘not completely certain’, making her choice to eat steak much less reckless than if the 
doctor were to choose drug A or B. We might represent the cases as follows: 
Drugs Belief Credence Facts 
A Cure 0.5 Cure 
B Partial Cure 1 Partial Cure 
C Death 0.5 Death 
 
Dinner Belief Credence Facts 
Steak  Morally Permissible 0.9 Morally Permissible 
Tofu Morally Permissible  1 Morally Permissible  
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Martha’s high credence in the permissibility eating steak helps to mitigate the 
recklessness of her choice, and contributes to the sense that she is not blameworthy. 
Another feature of her epistemic situation that might be thought to mitigate Martha’s 
blameworthiness is that that the doubts Martha has are comparable to doubts she 
would have about most philosophical conclusions. We might think it would be 
unreasonable to expect her to be any more confident; such that when she chooses steak 
it would not be possible for her to be any more certain. It is very difficult – if not 
impossible – for a conscientious epistemic agent to achieve complete certainty in most 
philosophical claims, and a greater degree of certainty might even make us suspicious. 
If this is right, then Martha’s 0.9 credence makes her about as sure as it is reasonable 
to be about a moral claim, and so plausibly carries much more weight than the same 
credence for a factual claim, where certainty is often more achievable. Compare 
Martha to her more reckless counterpart: 
Lunch. Louise is deciding whether to have steak or tofu for lunch. She 
prefers steak, but knows there are ethical questions around meat-eating. 
She has studied the relevant biological and philosophical literature, and 
is still unsure. She is inclined to think that meat eating is permissible, 
but she is not completely sure if this is what the evidence supports, and 
furthermore she suspects that wishful thinking might be influencing her 
evaluation of the evidence. So, she has doubts about the correct answer. 
As a matter of fact, Louise is right that it is permissible for her to order 
steak, and a fully informed person in her position would know this. 
 
It seems far less plausible that Louise’s recklessness is blameless, as it seemed that 
Martha’s could be. While both Louise and Martha make reckless choices, Louise’s 
choice is much more reckless because she is much less sure that her beliefs are correct. 
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Louise could have easily chosen the low risk option until she had investigated the 
relevant considerations more carefully, and the fact that she does not is plausibly what 
contributes to her deserving a more negative evaluation.  
A further relevant feature in determining how reckless a choice is, and what kind of 
evaluation agents deserve is the agent’s evidential state. Consider the following 
example: 
Breakfast. Nora is deciding whether to eat steak or tofu for breakfast. She 
prefers steak, but knows there are ethical questions around meat-eating. 
She has not bothered to study the relevant biological and philosophical 
literature, even though as a well-educated philosophy student, it would 
not be difficult for her to do so. Nevertheless, she is almost (but not 
completely) certain that it is permissible to eat steak. This is mostly 
because meat-eating seems natural to her, and most members of her 
community do not find eating meat morally problematic. As a matter of 
fact, Nora is right in that a fully informed person in her position would 
know that meat-eating was permissible.  
 
We could represent Nora’s credence in the permissibility of eating meat at 0.9, so just 
as high as Martha’s.  However, despite having identical credences, Nora seems much 
more deserving of negative evaluation than Martha. One explanation of this is that 
Martha’s evidential basis for her high credence is much better than Nora’s, and this 
means that her choice is much less reckless than Nora’s. Martha has done everything 
that we could expect of her in investigating the morally relevant features of the 
situation. In contrast, Nora could have done much more – as a philosophy student she 
has the capacity to be do much more to inform herself of the morally relevant features 
and better equip herself to reach a conclusion. Instead she has lazily relied on the 
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opinions of others. While both are reckless, Nora’s choice is much more reckless 
because it is based on a poor evidential foundation. These various features of Martha’s 
situation all contribute to mitigating the recklessness of her action, and the blame we 
might think she deserves.  
4.2 Inverse Akrasia 
If moral recklessness was a vice, we would expect agents who act morally recklessly 
to be blameworthy. Huck Finn was supposed to be an example of praiseworthy 
morally reckless action, and so a counterexample to the idea that moral recklessness 
is always blameworthy. However, further consideration of Huck’s motivations allow 
us to accommodate the intuition that Huck Finn is praiseworthy while maintaining 
that moral recklessness is a vice.  
Actions can be more or less praiseworthy, and different features of those actions can 
exhibit different degrees of praise and blameworthiness. Huck’s action has some 
praiseworthy aspects – it is part of the description of the case that Huck Finn acts in 
response to the right kinds of things; the recognition of Jim’s humanity, the desire to 
help a friend, for example. If he had instead freed Jim purely out of a desire to cause 
mischief, it is not so clear that he would deserve praise. However, in so far as Huck 
acts recklessly, he is not to be praised. The blameworthiness of his recklessness is 
compatible with there being other features of his action that are praiseworthy, and it 
is compatible with the possibility that his action overall has more praiseworthy 
features than blameworthy features. Huck’s action is praiseworthy, but it is not 
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maximally so. Had Huck freed Jim without acting recklessly, if he had freed Jim in the 
knowledge that his action was right, his action would have been even more 
praiseworthy. This would have removed any risk of error, error which might occur 
due to his false and objectionable belief that property rights can sometimes apply to 
people14. The normative externalist position cannot capture this aspect of the Huck 
Finn case – its explanation for Huck Finn’s praiseworthiness is that moral beliefs are 
irrelevant to the moral worth of our actions, but this means that it cannot distinguish 
between cases of inverse akrasia like Huck Finn’s case, and cases in which agents do 
the right thing because they know it is the right thing. An alternative explanation that 
can make this distinction is that Huck’s action is praiseworthy because it has features 
that are sufficiently praiseworthy so as to outweigh any other features of it that would 
otherwise make it not praiseworthy. This is consistent with moral recklessness being 
in general blameworthy rather than praiseworthy. To illustrate this, compare an agent 
who acts just as recklessly as Huck, but without the praiseworthy qualities that 
redeem his action. 
Tuck Finn. Huck’s cousin, Tuck, lives in the same society as Huck and 
has the same moral opinions. Like Huck, Tuck believes, as everyone in 
his society “knows,” that helping a slave escape amounts to stealing, and 
stealing is wrong. Tuck harbours an intense and unreasonable dislike for 
Miss Watson, and in order to spite her conspires to help one of her slaves 
escape.  
 
                                                          
14 (Sliwa 2016) also makes this point.  
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It seems fairly clear that Tuck is not to be praised for his action. This is the case even 
if we think he does the right thing. In so far as Tuck does the right thing, he does so 
accidentally. He is not to be praised for this accidental right action because the 
motivations out of which he does it are in no way admirable – he believes what he is 
doing is morally wrong, and his main motivation is a desire to spite Miss Watson. We 
might think of this as an example of a case in which praiseworthiness and moral 
rightness come apart15. To bolster the point, notice that Huck’s akrasia only seems 
unproblematic when the agents end up doing the right thing. Compare the following 
case: 
Mafia. Dmitri, like most people in his society, believes that killing is 
wrong. He is a member of the mafia, and as well as believing that 
killing is wrong values friendship and loyalty to family very highly. 
An associate has wronged his brother, and it seems to him that the 
only respectable thing to do would be to kill the associate, even 
though this would be morally wrong. Although he knows it is 
wrong, he just cannot bring himself to let the wronging slide and 
shame his family, so he sets out to murder the associate.   
 
This is an inverted inverse akrasia case. While Huck Finn does the right thing 
akratically, Dmitri ends up doing the wrong thing akratically. Unlike Huck Finn, he 
seems blameworthy. This suggests that part of what the intuition that Huck Finn is 
praiseworthy is tracking is the fact that he does something good rather than bad in 
spite of false beliefs. There are possible explanations for the sense that this intuition is 
correct that are neutral on the issue of moral recklessness. For example, it is possible 
                                                          
15 See (Hawthorne and Srinivasan 2013) for further discussion of this.  
Claire Field  claire.a.field@gmail.com 
27 
 
that we judge Huck as praiseworthy is because in unknowingly responding to reasons 
that make freeing Jim morally right, he is taking a first step away from the false views 
held by his society, and so beginning to equip himself with the tools to do the right 
thing in the future. What all this suggests is that the Huck Finn case does not on its 
own demonstrate any asymmetry in the significance of factual and normative 
uncertainty, and nor it does it show that moral recklessness is not a vice, since there 
are explanations of the Huck Finn case that are compatible with both factual and moral 
beliefs being equally significant for appraisal, and with moral recklessness being a 
vice.  
4.3 Moral Heroism and Moral Inertia 
The third apparent asymmetry was that while the kind of factual cautiousness 
employed in Drugs is a good general policy for decision making, the same cannot be 
said for comparable moral cautiousness. The worry was that when employed as a long 
term policy, moral cautiousness inhibits moral progress, because it makes it 
unacceptable for the morally conscientious to act on anything less than certainty, and 
it can seem that considerations of peer disagreement mean that a very high credence 
in a counter-culture moral view would be unjustified.  I want to argue that this worry 
is unfounded. It is unfounded because it arises only on the assumption that the 
disagreement of the authorities of one’s community is evidence that undermines 
justification for unorthodox moral beliefs, and this assumption is false.  
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Even if we agree that disagreement constitutes evidence that should lead us to revise 
our credences, it is typically only the disagreement of epistemic peers that should push 
use to revise our credences. One way to resist the assumption that community 
disagreement constitutes evidence against one’s view is to deny that the moral 
authorities of one’s community are epistemic peers. The standard account of epistemic 
peerhood says that epistemic peers need to have the same evidence and be equally 
competent in assessing their evidence – they should be equally intelligent, 
conscientious, and free from bias (see Christensen, 2009; Kelly, 2005). It is not clear 
that the putative moral authorities of one’s community meet these criteria for 
epistemic peerhood16. For instance, it is not clear that they have the same evidence. 
People who disagree about morality often do so while citing different considerations 
in favour of their views, and may not recognise the same kinds of considerations as 
evidence. Even if they do recognise the same considerations, they may weight their 
importance differently17. It is also far from clear that communities who have false 
moral views can be said to be free from bias.  
Even if it were true that our moral heroes and their opponents were epistemic peers, 
it need not be true that morally heroic actions are always reckless, since it is very 
possible that the beliefs of moral heroes have better epistemic standing than those of 
                                                          
16 Indeed, King (2012) argues that we have very few genuine epistemic peers.   
17 See (Sticker, forthcoming) who argues that ethical disagreements are not the kind of 
disagreements that require us to lower our credences, and this is because our ethical views 
are heavily influenced by what the agent considers as relevant evidence bearing on ethical 
questions. 
Claire Field  claire.a.field@gmail.com 
29 
 
those who disagree with them. As highlighted in section 4.2, the epistemic standing 
of one’s beliefs matters for whether or not acting on them is reckless. In so far as moral 
heroes have high credences in beliefs that are based on good evidence, we need not 
think that they are reckless to act on them. It is worth noting that if they really are 
moral heroes rather than moral villians, it should not be impossible for epistemically 
responsible conduct to lead them to true beliefs, and the mere disagreement of others 
need not undermine well-supported true beliefs18. 
As such, there is no reason why avoiding moral recklessness should lead to moral 
inertia when employed as a long term policy. However, what does come out of this 
discussion is a reminder of the importance of seeking out good evidence when 
forming our moral beliefs, and that mere reliance on the opinions of our communities 
will not suffice for justification. An example of moral villainy illustrates this: 
Forums. Martin spends a lot of time on online forums discussing politics. 
He shuns the mainstream press and reads only publications 
recommended by others in the forum. He has come to form some 
unorthodox moral opinions to the effect that foreigners ought to be 
sought out and murdered, and that the Aryan race is to be preserved at 
all costs. Most people in his community beyond the internet forums 
disagree with him, but he believes he is right, and sees himself as 
standing up for what is right. In an effort to do the right thing, he tries 
to encourage his Turkish neighbours to leave by shouting obscenities at 
them in the street.   
 
The reason why Martin’s behaviour is wrong while Rosa Parks’ behaviour is right is 
that Martin’s is not based on good evidence at all, while Rosa’s (I assume) is. Moral 
                                                          
18 See also (Kelly 2010) 
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heroism is compatible with moral conscientiousness, so long as our moral heroes are 
epistemically responsible. When they are not, they risk being like Martin the moral 
villain, and they act recklessly. Morally reckless action, just like factually reckless 
action, is to be avoided.  
5. Conclusion 
I have argued here that there is no asymmetry between normative and factual 
uncertainty, and I have shown how it is possible to explain away some apparent 
asymmetries between normative and factual uncertainty by closer consideration of the 
cases. Since the asymmetries are merely apparent, there is no reason to think that 
moral recklessness is not a moral wrong, as factual recklessness is. If this is correct, 
then normative Jackson cases are no less possible than factual Jackson cases19.  
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